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WHITE COLLAR CRIME FROM SCRATCH: SOME
OBSERVATIONS ON THE EAST EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE
SARAH N. WELLING*
I. INTRODUCTION
When Paul Marcus called about this project, I thought, what can
I say that is interesting in eight to twelve pages? I considered un-
tangling the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel. I con-
sidered scrutinizing the crime of engaging in monetary transactions
with property derived from specified unlawful activity Ultimately,
I decided to go with my thoughts on white collar crime in the reor-
ganized countries of Eastern Europe. Because Paul described this
as an Essay, I have seized on it as an opportunity to write some-
thing other than traditional legal scholarship.
Over the past year, I have been working with an American Bar
Association program called the Central and East European Law
Initiative ("CEELI"). I was introduced to the program in May of
1992 when a CEELI person called and asked me if I was interested
in going to Europe. I was, so shortly thereafter, I was a panelist on
white collar crime at a Polish Bar Association meeting in Poland.1
What I've been exposed to through CEELI is Eastern Europe's
conversion to democracy and a market economy Specifically, I
have focused on the role of white collar crime in this conversion.
The Poles, with whom I worked to draft white collar crime laws,
are starting basically from scratch. Usually we have to imagine the
"scratch," 2 but many of the Eastern European countries are exper-
iencmg it now.
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. The author thanks Michael
Diedring, John Byrne, Scott Michel, Bob Schwemm, and Sara Beale for all kinds of help on
this Essay.
1. Since that time, I have worked with CEELI in other ways. In October of 1992, I helped
to write a paper on comparative money laundering laws for the Bulgarian government, and
m February of 1993, Dr. Vinko Hlaca, Dean of the University of Rijeka in Croatia, visited
my law school and lived in my home for a week. Additionally, I spent May of 1993 as a law
professor at the University of Rijeka in Croatia.
2. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA
L. REV. 1 (1991).
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Starting from scratch offers Americans an opportunity to gain
insight.' This Essay will talk about Poland, white collar crime laws
in Poland, and white collar crime laws in Eastern Europe gener-
ally Along the way, we'll examine what lessons the Poles can teach
us about this area of law and about our attitudes toward it.
II. EASTERN EUROPE AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME
The CEELI program, funded by grants, was established in 1989
to encourage contact between American lawyers and lawyers from
the emerging Eastern European democracies.4 The American Bar
Association ("ABA") hopes that by bringing lawyers together,
Americans can help the countries establish legal systems suited to
their new structures. Specifically, the purpose of my Poland trip
was to help that country develop white collar crime laws during the
Polish Bar Association's annual conference at a resort in Kiekrz, a
suburb of Poznan, and we were scheduled to attend the two-day
conference and discuss American white collar crime.5
The first day we arrived in Warsaw, we were met by Bozena
Sarnecka-Crouch, the CEELI liaison in Poland. She is from Poland
and has remarkable American credentials.6 A fair number of
women lawyers attended the conference, many of whom turned out
to be judges. I did not expect this. One of our translators explained
that under the Communist system, judges were basically govern-
ment functionaries, writing up decisions under orders from the
state. Judgeships were technical jobs without the discretion and
prestige Americans expect. On the other hand, professors had a lot
of prestige under the old system because they had greater freedom
to say what they thought. Although one therefore might expect to
find few women professors, two of the professors working on white
3. See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, Exporting the American Bill of Rights: The Lesson from
Romania, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 1065.
4. See Mark S. Ellis, The Democratization of Central and Eastern Europe: An
Afterword, 7 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 743, 743 n.* (1992). Mr. Ellis is the Executive Direc-
tor of CEELI.
5. The others making the trip were Scott Michel, a partner at Caplin & Drysdale, and
John Byrne, senior counsel to the American Bankers Association.
6. Ms. Sarnecka-Crouch has a J.D. from Duke, an S.J.D. from Tulane, is a member of the
Pennsylvania Bar, and has clerked for a bankruptcy judge in California. Most recently,
before joining CEELI, she worked as a senior legal specialist on Poland at the Library of
Congress.
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collar crime from the University of Adam Mickiewicz in Poznan7
were women.
The next day the group traveled to Poznan, where we were met
by Professor Ratajczak and Professor Piotr Gosieniecki, law
professors at UAM.8 Professor Ratajczak, who is also president of
the Polish Bar Association, ran the conference. The conference
theme was "Law and Lawyers in the Times of the New System."
This was only the second time the Polish Bar Association has had
an annual meeting. Under the old system, the lawyers did meet,
but the meetings were lifeless, government-orchestrated affairs
that were not taken seriously
At a meeting to prepare for the conference, we discussed how
Americans might help the Poles. Government corruption now is
recognized as a problem in Poland. Before, it was the order of the
day- institutionalized and semi-legal. 9 While government corrup-
tion makes Americans mad,10 Poles seem more inured to it. The
country has no tradition of defining white collar crime or prosecut-
ing government officials. At our meeting, the regional chief prose-
cutor lamented that last year, in the Poznan district covering
roughly a quarter of the country, no one was prosecuted for bribery
or government corruption.
Moreover, the process of prosecuting criminals is newly complex.
Poland lacks experienced agents to investigate fraud. " In addition,
new issues arise because democracy and capitalism respectively
mandate a more complicated process and more complicated crimes.
As one writer recounted:
7. The University, named for a famous poet, is known as UAM.
8. At this point, we began to realize how difficult the language barrier would be. We
spoke no Polish, and only one of the Polish participants spoke any English. The second
language for most Poles is Russian, or sometimes German, because when the Soviet Union
was in charge, few English classes were offered, and Russian classes were mandatory.
9. Lawrence Weschler, A Reporter at Large: Deficit, NEW YORKER, May 11, 1992, at 60,
66.
10. See, e.g., Your Turn on Ethics Leaders Had Their Chance; Now, Voters Have Theirs,
LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Feb. 23, 1993, at A6; With Good Guys Like These Even
Some of The Best Lawmakers Treat Campaign Funds Like Their Own, LEXINGTON HER-
ALD-LEADER, Jan. 10, 1993, at F1; Bill Estep et al., Indictment Details Payoff of $37,000;
Ex-Racing Official Spurner Indicated; More Are Likely, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, May
21, 1992, at Al.
11. Weschler, supra note 9, at 68.
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Economic crime was simpler before capitalism. Workers swiped
stuff from state factories. The police persuaded them to confess.
How9 "By kicking them," says Kazimiersz Krasny, deputy head
prosecutor at the Ministry of Justice. "Now we have to find out
about business, everything about the free market," Mr. Krasny
says. "We have to educate ourselves."' 2
After the opening, Professor Gosieniecki drove us out to the re-
sort and conference center in Kiekrz, thirty minutes outside Poz-
nan, where the rest of the conference was held. 3
The first substantive session of the conference was slated for the
discussion of general topics. The Poles reported on the status of
their white collar crime laws. They have proposed a long and com-
plex statute protecting economic relations.' 4
The next session was on money laundering. I described the U.S.
laws on money laundering. 15 After reading part of our complex
money laundering statutes aloud,'" I asked the Polish participants
if they would be interested in a general fraud statute, noting that
the United States' mail fraud statute has helped us deal with un-
anticipated fraud schemes. 17 They said "no, thank you," because
12. Barry Newman, Poland Has Plenty of One Thing: Crooks, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 1991,
at 18 (International Section).
13. The name of the conference center is "Osrodek Komendy Wojewodzkej Policji," and
it is one of the nicest facilities in Poland. In the old days, it was used as a state training and
vacation center for police. Now, it is struggling to stay afloat, and the proprietors were
happy to rent it to lawyers for two days.
14. The statute is entitled, "Statute on the Protection of Economic Transactions." It is
difficult to read. For example, Article 1, Section 1, provides:
Whoever for the purpose of acquiring a great material benefit takes advan-
tage of the activity of a legal entity or of an organizational unit not having a
legal personality, in agreement with another person commits an offense and by
such [offense] causes them or another legal entity or an organizational unit, a
person being a member of them, another person or the State Treasury great
property damage-Shall be subject to the penalty of deprivation of liberty for
from 2 to 12 years.
Statute on the Protection of Economic Transactions, art. 1, § 1 (draft Mar. 12, 1992) (Pol.)
At first I thought that we could help the Poles with drafting a clearer statute, however, after
having reread the RICO statute, I abandoned that plan.
15. I skipped the reporting laws. Poland is a cash economy, and cash transactions are not
suspicious. Thus, I discussed the substantive money laundering crimes, codified at 18 U.S.C.
§9 1956, 1957 (1988), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (Supp. II 1990).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1956.
17. Weschler, supra note 9, at 68 (discussing the names and multitudes of schemes).
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such a general statute would not be useful in a civil code country
with no common law to interpret it.
After lunch the topic was tax fraud. The country did not have a
personal income tax until 1992.18 Poles are hostile to the idea of
taxes. Tax evasion is considered a heroic act.19 "Tax-dodging runs
deep m the Polish psyche, and was almost a badge of honor under
the communist system that was toppled in 1989."'20 This attitude
has not changed much over four years, but in view of Poland's
huge deficit," it must change soon. When we suggested to a Polish
tax fraud prosecutor that American prosecutors often choose
prominent targets,22 he rejected the idea immediately The Polish
prosecutor said that prosecuting a high-profile person would only
further alienate the people from the tax authorities.
The discussion turned to the corruption of government officials
and the investigation of bribery The other panelists and I de-
scribed the pyramid method. This method involves getting some
leverage over people at the lower levels of power in order to induce
them to testify against those higher in the pyramid. In the United
States, people who testify against higher-ups generally are de-
scribed as "cooperating with the government." When the Poles
asked questions about this approach, the translators described it as
encouraging people to "denounce" each other to the government.
This was a novel and chilling way to characterize it. We also dis-
cussed stings as a method of investigation, including the contours
of the entrapment defense and the use of plea bargaining. The
Poles don't use plea bargains, and they seemed interested. I would
have liked to have learned more about this, but time was short.
Wprost, the Polish equivalent of Newsweek magazine, inter-
viewed me. The main question Wprost wanted to ask was, "Why
should Poland, a relatively poor country, try to stop large amounts
18. Government Monitors Collection of New Personal Income Tax, IN'L FIN. DAILY
(BNA), Feb. 25, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNAIFD file.
19. Officials Outline IRS Help in Setting up Polish Tax System, INT'L FIN. DAILY (BNA),
Apr. 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNAIFD file.
20. Patricia Koza, Poland Launches Income Tax, UPI, Jan. 17, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, UPI file.
21. See Weschler, supra note 9, at 62 (discussing Poland's suddenly looming huge budget
deficit).
22. We were thinking of Leona Helmsley.
1993]
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of money from passing through the country, even if it is just pass-
ing through to be laundered?" 23 This was a reasonable question,
especially because Poland does not see much of the harm caused
by the underlying drug trade that generates the cash. I proposed to
the reporter that because Poland had just shaken off domination
by one group, the country should not want to give potentially dom-
inant power to another (arguably less savory) group.
On Monday, after we spoke at the University of Warsaw Crimi-
nal Law Society, we explored Warsaw and visited the monuments
to the Warsaw Uprising and to the Ghetto. Signs of "baby capital-
ism" were everywhere. Bozena pointed out a row of stalls. In the
old days, the government allocated the stalls to particular farmers
who were allowed to sell their produce privately With the new free
market, competition broke out and soaring rents drove the previ-
ous tenants out. Finally, ironically we walked through a square
where the old Communist Party Headquarters now serves as the
stock market.
III. CONCLUSION
I was left with these thoughts.
The "wickedly difficult ongoing transition to capitalism ' 4 is
tough. How do you take a country where everything is owned by
the government and convert it to private ownership 9 There is no
helpful analogue. No one has ever done this.
One example of the difficulties is severe inflation. In May of
1992, the conversion rate was about 13,075 zlotys to a dollar. Taxi
fares are quoted somewhere between 400 and 600 times the meter
amount because constantly changing the meters became too expen-
sive. The meter price times 400 is a good price; the meter price
times 600 is getting high.
Along with the difficulties, the conversion to capitalism has pro-
duced some comic effects. In Kierkz, the only television program-
ming available in English is CNN, MTV, and reruns of Bewitched.
In Warsaw, financially strapped Russians hawk used Russian army
23. See generally Grzegorz Cydejko, Laundering Polish Money: Dash and Deposit, WAR-
SAW VOICE, Dec. 20, 1992, available in LEXIS, Europe library, WRSAWV file (discussing
the ease with which people launder money at the Polish borders).
24. Weschler, supra note 9, at 62.
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uniforms to Westerners on the streets. The Poles have a sharp
sense of humor about their situation. When one of the American
panelists asked the Polish moderator if he could go back to his
room for a minute during the conference, the moderator replied,
"It's a free countryt" and laughed.
The newspapers have reported on the explosion of white collar
crime in Poland since its conversion to capitalism. 25 Yet this type
of crime is difficult to document. When the Soviets ran the show,
fraud and government corruption were neither recognized nor ac-
knowledged.26 Moreover, such crime was not reported, so the sta-
tistics for the years before 1989 are suspect.2 7
As the Poles and other Eastern Europeans convert to capitalism
and market economies, the challenge in white collar crime is to de-
fine the line between creative and aggressive entrepreneurial activ-
ity and fraud. Right now, the Poles have no experience with this
line. Even once the line has been defined, it must be explained and
communicated so that people to whom capitalism is new can un-
derstand it. This is a big assignment. We in the United States still
have trouble with the line, and we have been working on it for
more than 200 years.
The Poles' attitude toward taxes is an attitude of cynicism re-
sulting from their years of totalitarianism.2 Their attitude has not
kept up with the pace of reform. Comparatively, the American at-
titude is very cooperative, even taking into account Americans'
complaints about taxes and their cynicism toward government.
Our attitude toward government was one of the most valuable
things we had to offer the Poles; it was more valuable than any
specific information we possessed.
25. See generally Stephen Engelberg, Poland's New Climate Yields Bumper Crop of Cor-
ruption, N.Y. TimEs, Nov. 12, 1991, at Al (discussing Poland's explosion in corruption of
government officials); Newman, supra note 12 (discussing the expansion of economic crime
in Poland).
26. See generally Blanca Jicinska, Can Communist Crimes Be Punished?, NAT'L REV.,
May 25, 1992, at 34 (listing the few meager prosecutions of government officials when coun-
tries were under Communist rule).
27. See Przeglad Tygodniowy, About the Economy, WARSAW VoicE, Apr. 12, 1992, availa-
ble in LEXIS, Europe library, WRSAWV file (quoting a prosecutor from the Ministry of
Justice who stated that police statistics before 1989 are not credible because they were bent
to political needs).
28. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
1993]
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I can see how people become addicted to being in foreign places
during dramatic change. Watching the Eastern European countries
establish white collar crime laws from ground zero is compelling
and full of lessons for Americans. Previously I had little bent for
comparative law, but now I am converted.
